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MAKING LEGAL SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  




Of late, there is a profuse and generous recognition of human rights in 
constitutions. Such recognition is accorded in Ethiopia in its 1995 Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s (FDRE) Constitution. A quick glance at 
chapter three of the text of the Constitution will beckon us to the fact that 
almost all types of rights recognized in the International Bill of |Rights1 are 
granted a constitutional status. Such recognition is of immense significance in 
setting the standards and laying down the foundation for the growth of a 
vibrant human rights culture. It also establishes the fact that in Ethiopia any 
violation of human rights, if tolerable at times, is a mark of our falling short 
of our constitutional commitments. It signals a collective rejection of the idea 
                                           
*This piece was originally prepared for a training of Judges in Oromia in a Workshop 
organized by Justice for All- Prison Fellowship, Ethiopia in August 2009, and I am 
grateful to the participants for their comments and questions in the course of the 
workshop as the questions and comments that transpired therein have helped me 
improve the piece. I am also grateful to the anonymous referees (to whom Mizan Law 
Review had sent this article and) who pointed out some serious flaws in the original 
manuscript. 
**Tsegaye Regassa (LL.B, LL.M, PhD Candidate) teaches at the Institute of Federalism 
and Legal Studies of the Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC) and the Law Faculty 
and Institute of Federal Studies of Addis Ababa University (AAU). Currently, he is also 
a Visiting Professor of African Law and Legal Pluralism at the Law Faculty of the 
University of Trento, Trento, Italy. He can be reached at: tsegayer@gmail.com. 
 1 The International Bill of Rights (IBR) is a short hand for the plethora of international 
human rights instruments that came into existence since 1945 and has become a 
ubiquitous body of ‘laws’ that serve as the morality of governance everywhere in  the 
contemporary world. The instruments that form the core of the IBR are: the United 
Nations Charter (UNC), especially its human rights provisions such as those in art 1, 
55, etc.; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966(1976); and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966(1976). The 
UNC is a treaty that internationalized human rights and even served as the basis of the 
UDHR and subsequent human rights treaties. These instruments that make up the IBR 
have been magnified and multiplied in their echoes through the numerous regional 
human rights instruments adopted in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East. 
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that one can defy human dignity with impunity. More positively, it states in 
explicit terms that we, as a country, are one that honours, and is constrained 
by, the humanist value that human dignity and worth is fundamental to our 
system of governance. Nevertheless, the task of concretizing these rights and 
converting the same into legally consumable commodities2 is yet to be done. 
This piece seeks to raise some questions that help us think fruitfully about 
how to make a legal sense of human rights in Ethiopia. 
In any country with democratic governance (aspirationally theoretically 
or immediately practically), the judiciary, as part of the trias politica, is one 
of the most important institutions of human rights protection. The judicial 
branch is at the forefront of the effort at discharging the protective 
responsibility of the state apropos of human rights. In this piece, I seek to 
inquire into the role of the judiciary in the effort to make a legal sense of 
human rights in Ethiopia.  
In order to do that, I will first –in section one—discuss the concept, 
features, and types of human rights in general. I also dwell upon why they 
matter to us. In section two, I make a call for looking beyond cynicism and 
fundamentalism as we advocate for a better protection of human rights. This 
is because in the process of making a legal sense of human rights, it is 
important to be realistic about a number of factors that constrain our 
performance in relation to the promotion, protection, and fulfilment of human 
rights. In section three, we delve into the more concrete and practical steps, 
methods, and techniques needed for making a legal sense of human rights in a 
particular legal system. In section four, I focus on the specific roles of the 
judiciary with regard to the protection of human rights. That will be followed 
by some concluding remarks.  
This study, it is important to note, is a study of the normative framework 
for the judicial protection of human rights in Ethiopia. The study is thus 
limited in scope to the analysis of the constitutional and other relevant legal 
texts. Consequently, this study does not make a case-based, or empirically 
informed, analysis of the human rights situation. Any reference to practical 
issues, if any, will be only tangential and is meant for the purpose of 
illustration. It is important to note, however, that a case-based and empirical 
inquiry into the matter is necessary. This study—regrettably--does not do that 
nonetheless. 
 
                                           
2 By this I mean rights that one can take to court to assert them as concrete legal claims, 
rights that can be litigated and deserving remedies when the argument in their favour 
has won. 
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1. Human Rights: What are they and why do they Matter? 
1.1-Definition  
The question regarding what human rights are and how they should be 
defined has attracted a number of thinkers who advance a diverse array of 
theories3 on the nature of human rights into the details of which it is not the 
purpose of this piece to go. At a very basic level, human rights can be defined 
as entitlements that all human beings assert merely because they are human. 
As such human rights are basic moral claims invoked for the purpose of 
enjoying a decent human life rooted in dignity. Often linked to the nature of 
human kind, they are also asserted as ‘natural’ rights.4 Consensus among 
human rights scholars reflects that they emanate from fundamental human 
dignity and worth.5 Mariek Piechowiak recognizes and reinforces the 
consensus when she defines human rights as rights of all human beings 
acknowledged independently of law.6  Amparo Tomas,7 discussing human 
rights in the context of his argument for human rights based approach to 
                                           
3 Indeed, a number of theories can be identified on the nature of rights. Prominent among 
these are the will theory, the interest theory, the claims theory, the entitlement theory, 
and the entitlement-plus theory. For a crisp summary and the details of their differences 
from one another, see James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (2nd ed). 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. An excerpt of the earlier version of the same book 
entitled, “Making Sense of Human Rights” (revised edition), 2004 is available at: 
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/humanrights/HUMR4130/h05/undervisiningsmate
riale/Nickel%25sense%2014%20sept/%202004.doc. The theories referred to herein 
above are available on pp. 34-46. 
4 Tied to human nature or human reason, human rights are often, rightly, conceived as 
antedating government and law. Consequently, human rights are viewed not as grants 
from government as an expression of the charitable nature of governments but as basic 
standards for human treatment that all governments need to recognize. Human rights 
are thus not gifts from government. They are not conferred on citizens by state; they are 
merely guaranteed by states. Reflecting this connection of human rights to human 
nature, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in its article 1 says that 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. 
5 This consensus is reflected in the UDHR both in the preamble (which recognizes “the 
inherent dignity” of all members of the human family) and article 1 (which stipulates 
that all human beings, being born free and equal, are “equal in dignity and rights”). 
Note that the language of the UDHR has shaped this consensus. 
6 Mariek Piechowiak, “What are Human Rights?: The Concept of Human Rights and 
their Extra-legal Justification,” in Hanski, R, and Suksi, Markku (eds), An Introduction 
to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Text Book. (2nd Rev ed). 
Turku/Abo: Institute of Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1999. P.3 
7 Amparo Tomas, “A Human Rights based Approach to Development: Primer for 
Development Practitioners. [NP, n. pub], 2005. P. 3. 
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development, defines human rights as “universal legal guarantees that belong 
to all human beings and that protect individuals and/or groups from actions 
and omissions of the State and some non-State actors that affect fundamental 
human dignity.”8 
1.2-Features  
The most common features identified as attributes of human rights include the 
following: universality, inherence (in human dignity), inalienability, and 
equality.9 In a similar vein, Tomas identifies the following as attributes of 
human rights: a) that they are rooted in and exist for fundamental human 
dignity; b) that they are universal (belonging to all human beings); c) that 
they are legal guarantees against state actions and omissions; and d) that they 
protect both individuals and groups10. 
A few words are in order by way of a comment on the attributes. 
Universality refers to the applicability of human rights to all people 
everywhere at all times. This positioning of human rights as universal is often 
questioned and debated upon among scholars of relativist convictions who 
argue that human rights are relative.11 But, as Piechowiak says, often, the 
debate between Universalists and relativists is in the abstract. So while 
“universality and inherence are contested in theory”, they are “acceptable in 
practice”12. As evidence, she cites state practices and the Vienna Declaration 
and Program of Action of 199313 which states, in unequivocal terms, that 
                                           
8 This definition also reverberates in most other UN Human Rights manuals such as 
Human Rights and Law Enforcement : A Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights for the 
Police. New York/Geneva: UN, 2005, p. 13. 
9 Piechowiak, supra note 6, pp.5-8. 
10 Tomas, supra note 7, pp. 2-3. 
11 The debate as to whether the concept of human rights is universal or particular/relative 
to specific cultures started early in the history of the modern human rights movement.  
See the American Anthropological Association’s concern with the draft of the UDHR 
in the statement it issued in reaction to the draft of the UDHR in 1947 (in Steiner and 
Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, and Morals (2nd ed). 
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 372-374). See also Mary Ann 
Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. New York: Random House, 2002, pp. 221-233. Since then, the debate 
was extended to the varying conception of human rights in the West and the Muslim 
world. (See An-Naim, “Human Rights in the Muslim World” 3 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 13 (1990) on Islam on/and the concept of human rights.) 
12 Piechowiak, supra note 6, p 5. 
13 The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action on Human Rights [hereinafter the 
Vienna Declaration], although not legally binding on states, expresses the consensus 
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human rights are “the birth right of all human beings” and that “The universal 
nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.” Universalism rejects 
their particularity in essence. It also underscores the fact that they are trans-
temporal and, as such, pre-exist laws and states. 
Inherence refers to the existence of rights independently of the will of 
either an individual human being or a group of people. Thus, “they are neither 
obtained nor granted through any human action” (p.6). They exist in spite of 
the fact that one has the will or capacity to exercise them. 
Inalienability implies that nobody can deprive anyone of these rights and 
nobody can renounce these rights by himself. This is because the uniqueness 
of being human-- the substance in which the whole idea of human rights is 
rooted—being, the ground for assigning dignity to each and every human 
being, cannot allow an infringement or outright violation. Inalienability is 
partly grounded in taking every human being as an end rather than as a means 
to further other ends14. 
Equality as an attribute of human rights reminds us that everyone is 
entitled to rights “not as a consequence of, for example, being able to exercise 
free choices or to think logically” but rather because “there are no human 
beings which are more human than others”15. It is perhaps because of the 
salience of the above mentioned features of human rights that the 1993 
Vienna Declaration has had to stipulate that all human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interrelated and interdependent16. 
Apart from this, one does well to stress the fact that human rights tend to 
be emancipatory in their rhetoric. It is common place to hear any resistance 
movement to invoke human rights as the ‘utopia’ they aspire to enjoy 
subsequent to the success of their struggle while also considering their 
violations as the motivating and mobilizing cause behind their struggle.  
As moral claims, human rights pose a challenge to states both internally 
(from within) and externally (from without). As a result, neglect or abuse of 
rights often provokes a pressure on a state both politically and legally. 
Moreover, human rights impose limits on the exercise of power by 
                                                                                                         
that all human rights are equally significant: “[a]ll human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. ...” Section I, Paragraph 5. (June 1993).  
14 There is an established belief among philosophers that as ends, human beings cannot 
be used as mere tools employed to advance other goals. This belief contrasts with the 
idea maintained among those who assume that the advancement of economic growth 
requires the sacrifice of some fundamental rights of some members of the society. 
15 Piechowiak, supra note 6, p. 6 
16 The Vienna Declaration, supra note 13. 
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governments; in effect, they discipline power. Furthermore, in history, it 
tended to be biased towards the individual right to freedom from undue state 
intervention17. 
1.3-Development of Human Rights Norms 
Human rights laws developed in reaction to massive state abuse of human 
beings. The modern concept of human rights has also drawn impetus from the 
experiences of World War II (WWII). As such it is rooted in the experiences 
of ‘legal lawlessness’ that characterized the activities of some oppressive 
regimes18. In response to such lawlessness, the international human rights 
regime developed since WWII. The milestone in the history of the 
development of the international human rights system is the adoption at the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1948 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).19 The adoption of the subsequent 
                                           
17 In the evolution toward the modern human rights movement (which finally led to the 
International Bill of Rights [IBR]), the first category of rights (often referred to as civil 
and political rights) imposed a negative duty on state. As a result, the view that human 
rights are synonymous with such rights became predominant. See Danfred Titus, “The 
Generation of Fundamental Human Rights” in Nel and Bezuidenhoute (eds), Policing 
and Human Rights (2nd ed). Lansdowne, SA: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2002, pp. 85-102) on the 
generational classification of human rights. 
18 Developments leading up to the holocaust in Pre-War Germany are taken as examples 
of ‘legal lawlessness’ (See Tomas, supra note 7). In the domestic setting, the apartheid 
regime of South Africa is also taken as an example for such a state. See Richard Abel, 
Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against Apartheid, 1980-1994. New 
York: Routledge, 1995 on the route back to a human rights-sensitive system in South 
Africa. 
19 The UDHR, meant to serve as “a common standard of achievement for all nations”, is 
the single most important instrument that shaped the post-war human rights movement. 
Today, it forms the core of the International Bill of Rights (IBR). Although it is a 
declaration of mere 30 articles, it embodies the list of all rights that can be viewed as 
first, second, and third generation of rights.  The UDHR is viewed by scholars as one of 
the most magnificent achievement of the modern human civilization. Glendon, supra 
note 11, p. xvi) says that the UDHR “gave expression to diffuse, deep-seated longings 
and lent wings to movements that would soon bring down colonial empires. Its thirty 
concise articles inspired or influenced scores of post war and postcolonial constitutions 
and treaties, including the new constitutions of Germany, Japan, and Italy. It became 
the polestar of an army of international human rights activists, who pressure 
governments to live up to their pledges and train the searchlight of publicity on abuses 
that would have remained hidden in former times. ... It is the parent document, the 
primary inspiration, for most rights instruments in the world today.” (Italics added.) 
Note also Jack Donnelly, “The Universal Declaration Model of Human Rights: A 
Liberal Defense”(Human Rights Working Papers) available at :  
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covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 (to come into force in 1976) was a 
gradual but immense stride toward completing what later came to be the 
regime of the International Bill of Rights (IBR). Through these and other 
important instruments, the UN has discharged its responsibilities to set 
normative standards on human rights while also working with specialized UN 
bodies (e.g. the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
[UNHCHR] and the Committees) to develop mechanisms of monitoring and 
better implementation of rights.  
1.4-Taxonomy of Rights? 
Obviously there is a diverse array of rights that human beings claim, be it by 
virtue of the strength of laws or of morals. The classification of these diverse 
rights has generated a degree of controversy among human rights law 
scholars. Karel Vasak20, drawing from the motto of the French Revolution of 
1789--which propagated the principles of liberte, egalite, and fraternite—
developed the generational division of rights. Thus, he came up with the idea 
of “First Generation” rights of civil and political type, “Second Generation” 
rights of economic, social, and cultural type, and “Third Generation” rights of 
development, peace, environment, and others. His generational division of 
rights has led to the emergence of the idea of what are called liberty rights 
(i.e., civil and political rights), equality rights (i.e., economic and social 
rights), and solidarity rights (i.e., rights to development, environment, and 
peace).  
Rights are also classified based on the kind of duties that they impose 
upon the duty-bearers (which, often, is the state). Thus, scholars identify 
rights that impose negative duties on the state, (i.e., the duty to keep away 
from the free exercise of rights by citizens unhindered) and those that impose 
positive duties (i.e., the duty to act to protect or promote or/and fulfil some 
rights)21. It is important to note that civil and political rights often impose 
                                                                                                         
   http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/index.html last accessed in May 2009 
where he says that “the global human rights regime is rooted in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and its later elaborations, especially the 1966 
International human Rights Covenants.” P.1.  
20 Karel Vasak, “Human Rights: A Thirty-year Struggle—The Sustained Efforts to give 
Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” UNESCO Courier 30:11 
(Nov. 1977). Paris: UNESCO, 1977. 
21 It is important to note that there are critics who argue that rights that impose positive 
duties should not be legalized (constitutionally and internationally). See for instance 
Sunstein, “Against Positive Rights”2/1/ East European Constitutional Review 35 
(1993) p. 35 in Steiner and Alston supra note 10, pp. 280-282. Sunstein argues that 
 
3(2) Mizan Law Rev.                      MAKING LEGAL SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS                           295 
 
 
duties of the former kind while economic, social and cultural rights tend to 
impose duties of the latter kind. From this division come the difference 
between obligations to respect on the one hand and obligations to protect, 
promote, and fulfil on the other.22 
Depending on the nature of obligations, rights can also be classified as 
those which impose obligations of result or those which impose obligations of 
conduct.23  Moreover, rights can be self-executing (subject to automatic and 
immediate exercise) or programmatic (subject to progressive realization) 
depending on the ease with which they can be enjoyed24. Rights are also 
categorized into “individual” and “collective” depending on their active 
subjects (or beneficiaries), the latter being associative or organic groups as 
the case may be25. 
                                                                                                         
constitutionalizing economic and social rights threatens the two important values of: a) 
liberal rights such as “free speech, voting rights, protection against the abuse of the 
criminal justice system, religious liberty, barriers to invidious discrimination, property 
and contract rights”; and b)market economy. This is because, Sunstein seems to 
suggest, constitutionalizing them allows the creation of too big a government that we 
cannot subsequently tame. 
22 Obligations to respect are obligations to refrain from doing violative acts. Obligations 
to protect, promote, and fulfil impose obligations to act in certain ways so that states 
can create conditions for a decent human living  within which to exercise even civil and 
political rights. 
23 Obligations of result demand the delivery of particular goods and services while 
obligations of conduct require merely an effort towards ensuring the enjoyment of the 
right in a definite range of time. It is important to note that some rights (e.g. education) 
might impose both obligations of result and conduct.The right to free (and compulsory) 
elementary education imposes an obligation of result whereas the right to tertiary 
education (= state duty to expand higher educaton) is a form of obligation of conduct.  
24 ‘Self-executing’ rights can be exemplified by classical rights such as those to life, 
liberty, and security of the person (or physical integrity). ‘Programmatic’ rights are 
often the socio-economic rights such as the right to work, fair wage, trade union rights, 
adequate living standards, housing, health, education, and others. (See Titus supra note 
16 p.88) 
25 Marlies Galenkamp, Collective Rights versus Individual Rights. Rotterdam: PhD 
Thesis, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 1993. Galenkamp holds 
that collective rights, while they can be ascriptively made legal rights--rights by 
consensus—cannot be moral (and hence human) rights. Reason: collectivities do not 
have a moral agency that individuals have. This seems to assume that all collectivities 
are associative groups derived from the free association of free individuals on the 
choice of the latter. This in turn tends to ignore involuntary associations that may be 
called ‘anthropological persons’ such as ethnic, racial or generally identity-based 
groups. For more on this, see, for example, Will Kymlicka, Muticultural Citizenship: A 
Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
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Writing in relation to freedoms that are necessary for development (and 
in a context that is different from the usual human rights discourse), Amartya 
Sen26 makes a distinction between constitutive freedoms (e.g. rights to 
substantive freedoms such as the right to be free from want) and instrumental 
freedoms (e.g. political liberties, economic facilities, and social 
opportunities). 
In the process of the development of the International Bill of Rights, 
although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 had a 
comprehensive catalogue of rights with no hierarchy among them, the 
division between civil and political rights on the one hand, and the economic, 
social, and cultural rights on the other, came out to be pronounced in the 
international covenants that emerged subsequently bearing the names that 
echo the division we stated above27. Hence, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).28 
In closing this section, it is important to stress that human rights do 
matter because human dignity and worth matter. Human beings as an end, 
rather than a means, do matter. Violation of human rights thus amounts to 
defiance of the inherent human dignity. To violate them is in a sense to punch 
human dignity in the face. 
2. Human Rights in Ethiopia: Looking Beyond Cynicism and 
Fundamentalism 
There is no gainsaying that human rights are generously recognized in the 
contemporary constitutional system of Ethiopia. In this, the FDRE 
Constitution of 1995 marks a departure from the past. Ethiopia’s 
constitutional past suggests that the concept of human rights was not 
developed and that the practice of human rights was not one that is a cause of 
legitimate pride29. In the era of unwritten constitutions, i.e., in the time 
preceding 1931, citizens were mere subjects of the Emperors having 
privileges and benefits emanating from the Omni-benevolent Emperors 
                                           
26 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
27 The IBR is principally a sum total of four human rights instruments namely: the 
UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. See 
Titus supra note 17, p. 89. 
28 It is interesting to note that the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia (FDRE) hints at a distinction between “Human Rights” and “Democratic 
Rights”.  See art 10 (2) and parts I and II of the Human Rights Chapter, i.e., chapter 
three, of the FDRE Constitution. 
29 Reports of massive violations of rights abound especially in the era of the Derg. 
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merely on their goodwill.30 Citizens are not assumed to have rights in the 
sense of entitlement although they do assume duties towards the emperors 
(personally) and the government (officially).  
2.1-Historical Sketch  
In the era of written constitutions since 1931, this trend continued 
unmitigated. The 1931 Constitution being an Imperial grant (to the beloved 
subjects), it did not recognize human rights as such. Rather, it stressed duties 
while the notion of their being “entitled” to special privileges and benefits 
depending on the whims and conjectures of the Emperors from whom all 
benefits and privileges, and all justice and power, flows was maintained. The 
state is considered to owe no duty to the people. There was hardly any 
constitutional limit to state power save that which is tacitly imposed by 
religion and tradition (the principal sources of legitimacy in Ethiopia for 
centuries)31. As a consequence, even after Ethiopia was ushered into the era 
of written constitutions, the Monarchy was, at least theoretically, absolute32. 
In the Revised Constitution of 1955, continuity (rather than change) was 
dominant. The monarchy continued to be absolute. The state (and the 
bureaucracy) tended to be aristocratic. In spite of the fact that there was a 
stride made to embrace the ideals of rudimentary democracy33 and human 
rights, there was much to be desired in practice in this regard. There was 
recognition of a number of human rights in the constitution (including the 
right to assembly, association, and election, etc) but often constrained by the 
claw back clauses marked by the phrase such as “in accordance with the law”, 
                                           
30 The emperors in traditional Ethiopia are the sources of all goodness and bounties. So, 
rights, like the constitutions, are grants given to the subjects.(See the preambles to the 
1931 and the revised 1955 constitutions of Imperial Ethiopia.) 
31 Note that in Ethiopia force, religion and tradition are the triad sources of state 
legitimacy. See Ugo Matteii, “The New Ethiopian Constitution: First Thoughts on 
Ethnical Federalism”, 1995 for this. But see also the official nomenclatures of the 
Ethiopian emperors: “Conquering Lion [to mean mighty in force] of the Tribe of Judah 
[to invoke genealogy, tradition], Elect of God [marking the importance of religion], 
King of Kings, Emperor of Ethiopia.”  
32 Practically, due to factors such as poor infrastructure, poverty, and weak bureaucracy, 
they hardly governed the peripheries asserting absolute power. See generally James 
C.N Paul and Christopher Clapham, Ethiopian Constitutional Development: A Source 
Book (Vol 2). Addis Ababa: HSIU, 1972 on the theoretical omnipotence, Omni-
presence, and Omni-benevolence of the Ethiopian monarch. 
33 The lower house was constituted of members elected directly by the people although 
there were no political parties at the time. There was also property limitation for being a 
candidate. See Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian 
Prospect. Asmara/Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1997 for details. 
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or “as shall be determined by law”. One of the pressing problems of the time 
was the lack of access, on the part of the peasants, to economic “facilities” 
(such as land) that undermined the economic freedoms of large proportion of 
the population34.  
In 1974, the cumulative effect of long held popular discontents, the 
increasing radicalization of the intelligentsia, and the progressive activism on 
the part of the (often underpaid) military, led to a socialist revolution35 that 
dethroned the Emperor, suspended the constitution, dismissed the parliament, 
and established, eventually, a Provisional Military Administrative Council 
(PMAC) of a committee (Derg in Amharic) of junior military officials who 
ruled the country for about 13 years without a formal body of law one can 
conventionally call a constitution36. During the time from 1974 to 1987, the 
state of human rights deteriorated both conceptually and practically. One 
should note however that there was an emphasis, in rhetoric at least, on the 
importance of respect for socio-economic and cultural rights although they 
are not couched in words that reflect the notion of human rights. The 
redistribution of land and urban houses emboldened some aspects of socio-
economic rights. The secularization of the state led to the declaration of 
equality and non-discrimination on the basis of religion albeit much less to 
freedom of religion. Recognition of linguistic and cultural equality led to the 
denunciation of discrimination on linguistic and cultural grounds. 
This trend to emphasize socio-economic and cultural rights was 
continued in the 1987 Constitution of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (PDRE). Nevertheless, the constitution was overtaken by the nascent 
liberationist struggles that started in the wake of the 1974 Revolution and 
mounted a pressure on the government until it fell in 1991.37 While there was 
                                           
34 Land or its produce was owned by Land Lords. In the south, owing to the gult system, 
peasants had no rights over land. See generally, Desalegn Rahmato, The Peasant and 
the State: Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia 1950s-2000s. Addis Ababa: Addis 
Ababa University Press, 2009.  
35 There is a veritable body of literature (both in Amharic and English) that show that all 
the student and other ethno nationalist movements of the time drew inspiration from 
socialist icons such as Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Ze Dong, etc. Kiflu Tadesse That 
Generation (Amharic) (2 vols) 1997, 1998 and Andargatchew Assegid, Long Journey 
Cut Short (Amharic, translation mine) (2000) are only examples.  
36 For 13 years, although there was no constitution, there were a number of fundamental 
public law legislations that served the role of a constitution. See generally Fasil, supra 
note 33. 
37The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic 
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a protectionist state38 that put a high premium on the importance and primacy 
of economic, social, and cultural rights, there hardly was the concept of 
human rights as entitlement, especially among the populace. As a result, there 
was hardly a vibrant human rights culture that specially fostered the assertion 
of civil and political rights. 
After the fall of the Derg in 1991, the new regime promulgated a 
Transitional Charter which served as the interim constitution of Ethiopia for 
the time of the inter-regnum39. The Charter, although a terse document that 
was primarily viewed as a pact40 among various liberationist movements that 
toppled the Derg41, extended guarantee to a host of rights as recognized by 
the UDHR and other international instruments42. The accent was on Civil and 
Political rights. And yet the practice left much to be desired even in these 
times.43  
2.2-The FDRE Constitution  
After a prolonged transition44, a Federal Democratic Constitution was 
adopted in 1994 to come into force in 1995. This constitution was dubbed the 
constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The 
FDRE Constitution is a compact document with an admirable degree of 
clarity and conciseness. It has 106 articles packed in 11 chapters. In its 
chapter three (the chapter that can qualify for being the Ethiopian Bill of 
                                                                                                         
Movement (EPDM) which later changed itself into Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), etc were some of those ethno-nationalist movements. 
38 The Derg regime had run a tightly controlled economic system that is typically of a 
command type. Important resources such as land were owned by state. 
39 The Charter being “the supreme law of the land” was the de facto constitution of the 
time. 
40 A pact is an agreement among warring factions. Such agreements are often viewed as 
peace instruments.  
41 Almost all of them (except, for example, the trade unions, and the university and 
others) were representatives of ethno-nationalist groups.  
42 The preamble and article 2 invoke the UDHR as the basis on which all human rights 
are guaranteed. Political rights of association, assembly, demonstrations constituted the 
list of rights that dominated the early provisions of the Charter. 
43 There were frequent prohibitions of demonstrations and meetings. There were 
imprisonments without due process, for example, in relation to the cases of the alleged 
perpetrators of the Red Terror. 
44 As per the Transitional Charter, the transition was to be complete in two years. The 
transitional times were brought to a closure in 1995, two years later than promised. See 
Terrence Lyons, “Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996), pp. 121-142 on the 
transition. 
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Rights), it offers a long list of rights that are divided into two categories, 
namely that of ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Democratic Rights’45.  
In its Preamble, it embodies the principles of self-determination of 
collectivities, rule of law, democracy, development, fundamental rights and 
freedoms (of individuals and peoples), equality and non-discrimination, 
peace, affirmative action, etc. In its chapter two, the chapter stipulating the 
jural postulates46 of the new dispensation, the chapter on the “Fundamental 
Principles”, five principles namely, the principles of sovereignty of the 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia (art 8); constitutionalism and 
constitutional supremacy (art 9); sanctity of human rights (art 10); secularism 
(art 11); and accountability and transparency of government (art 12) were 
recognized. 
By virtue of the principle of popular sovereignty, the principle of 
democracy47 (the power to make, run, and even break one’s own government) 
was recognized. The perusal of art 8 gives the impression that direct, indirect, 
and participatory democracy is anticipated48. The principle of 
constitutionalism enshrined in art 9, stresses that there shall be no ascent to, 
and exercise of, power except in accordance with the constitution49. In this, it 
spelled a departure from Ethiopia’s constitutional past in which force, 
religion, and tradition, not law as such, were the sources of legitimacy50. Art 
9 also enshrined the principle of constitutional supremacy thereby 
superimposing the constitution on all other competing forms of law or 
practice. Consequently, all laws, decisions, and practices that were 
incompatible with the constitution are rendered of no effect51.  Rather 
curiously, this article also recognizes the fact that international treaties 
                                           
45 Arts 13-44 are devoted to “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” in general. Arts 14-28 
are dubbed “Human Rights” while arts 29-44 are dubbed “Democratic Rights”. 
46 “Jural Postulates” are the self-evident basic legal axioms underpinning the system. See 
Heinrich Scholler (2005). 
47 The constitution uses the term “nations, nationalities, and peoples” to refer to ethnic 
groups that it ascribes sovereignty to. (See arts 39(5) cum art 8). 
48 Art 8(3) says: “[The] sovereignty of [nations, nationalities, and peoples] is expressed 
through their representatives elected in accordance with this constitution and through 
their direct democratic participation.” thereby sanctioning representative (or indirect) 
and participatory democracy although the latter is done directly by the people. The 
provision seems to lump direct and participatory democracy together although the two 
are not quite the same. 
49 Art 9(3). 
50 Mattei, supra note 31, says that sources of state legitimacy in historic Ethiopia are 
force, tradition, and religion. 
51 Art 9(1) 
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adopted by Ethiopia are part and parcel of the legal system thereby suggesting 
the idea that Ethiopia’s is an open constitutional system52. But the status of 
such treaties in the hierarchy of laws is not clearly enunciated as a result of 
which the issue remains unresolved to date53. 
The principle of sanctity of human rights (art 10)--the principle that is 
most pertinent to the discussion in this paper--stipulates the inviolability and 
inalienability of fundamental rights and freedoms of ‘mankind’. It is this 
principle that, in a compact way, establishes the idea of inherence, 
universality, indivisibility, and inviolability of human rights. Hence, the term 
‘sanctity of human rights’54. 
The principle of secularism (art. 10) establishes that state and religion 
are separate, that there is no religion particularly favoured by the state, and 
that the two realms are mutually exclusive in the sense that one does not 
interfere in the business of the other. The separation of state and religion and 
the abolition of state religion is a remarkable departure from Ethiopia’s past 
(which ennobled the Ethiopian orthodox faith as the state religion). It also 
ushered in the era of inter-religious equality. The principle of mutual non-
interference of the secular in the sacred and of the sacred in the secular is also 
another remarkable departure from the past in which state action depended, to 
a large extent, on religion for its legitimacy55.  
The principle of accountability and transparency of government (art 12) 
establishes that government must be both responsible and responsive to the 
electorate while also making its operations public, open, and accessible to 
citizens56. The notion of making government responsible for its misdeeds, 
which was alien to Ethiopia’s constitutional past, goes a long way in helping 
                                           
52 Art 9(4) 
53 The issue of the status of international treaties is controversial because the constitution 
does not say whether they are as supreme as the constitution. The term ‘law’ in art 9(4) 
can also be taken to mean “proclamation, regulations, or directives” as a consequence 
of which treaties take the position of an ordinary law if and when ratified by the 
parliament. But it is also important to note that art 13(2) stresses the need to interpret 
human rights provisions in conformity to international instruments ratified by Ethiopia. 
At this juncture, one asks if international (human rights) instruments are even superior 
to the constitution’s human rights chapter.  
54 Art 10 
55 The Ethiopian Constitution seems to favour the strict separation model as distinct from 
the established church model, or the free exercise and non-established church model of 
the relation between state and religion. But a closer reading of the Constitution shows 
the existence of elements of the latter as well. But of course the practice is far more 
vague and blurred than this. 
56 Art 12 (1-3). 
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Ethiopians to take a financial, power/mandate, and time audit of the 
government. It also forces the government to prove itself in crisis 
management by being responsive to the demands and needs of the people 
during “its season in office”. The transparency flank of this principle requires 
that the state officials and offices be accessible to citizens and that their 
manner of operation be open, thereby requiring that they make information 
available to the public on demand (or otherwise). This helps: a) to facilitate 
the principle of good administration by fostering rational legitimacy to state 
action; and b) to empower citizens who, having been informed of the 
operation of government, will know that they are in control of their matters 
thereby preventing helplessness and the consequent despair. 
The cumulative effect of these five fundamental principles is that they 
create a congenial environment for a better protection of human rights in 
Ethiopia. One notes that these principles shape, influence, and control the 
behaviour of legal and political actors in the public life of Ethiopia as they 
provide a framework of understanding the system. It is within this context 
that the detailed rules (or provisions) of the constitution make sense. This is 
also true of the efforts to make sense of the human rights norms in the 
Constitution.  
The foundational principle that undergirds the normative structure of 
human rights in Ethiopia is the principle of sanctity of human rights enshrined 
under Article 10 of the FDRE Constitution which reads as follows: (1) 
“Human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, are 
inviolable and inalienable. (2) Human and democratic rights of citizens and 
peoples shall be respected.” This article enunciates the principle of sanctity of 
human rights in unequivocal terms. A closer examination of the words of the 
article suggests that: a) human rights are inherent in the nature of human kind 
(although the word used to refer to human kind is the narrower “mankind”); 
b) they are universal (i.e. applicable to every human); c) they cannot be 
subject to any legitimate violation; and d) they are indivisible. One can thus 
note that the principle at once spells a host of significant prescriptions about 
human rights. Thus one notes that they are, in essence, at once inherent, 
universal, indivisible, and even absolute. This gives the moral force that 
shapes and influences laws, decisions, practices, and actions taken in the 
public life of a society. 
Rather curiously, the second sub-article of article 10 seems to reinforce 
the inviolability principle when it said that they “shall be respected”. If it is 
there merely to reinforce the inviolability principle, one would surmise, then 
it is superfluous. But one suspects the existence of something more to it than 
the emphasis and reinforcement of the principle. The phrase “human and 
democratic rights” seems to make a distinction between the two thereby 
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pointing to the classification of the list of rights in chapter three into two parts 
named “Human Rights” (Arts 14-28) and “Democratic Rights” (Arts 29-
44).57 The important thing about this provision of principle, however, is that 
all categories of rights are coequally to be respected without one having any 
superior claim to the other in terms of being prioritized or subordinated. 
However, one remains wondering as to the wisdom of dividing the list of 
rights into these two broad categories when there is no prescribed mode of 
differential treatment of the two categories of rights and especially when one 
notices the fact that the classification used is not congruent with some of the 
traditionally accepted classifications. Is the distinction of mere descriptive 
significance, or does it have a prescriptive value? We do well to leave this 
question open for now. 
Apropos of the institutional structure, the primary institutions 
responsible for the protection, promotion , and enforcement of human rights 
in Ethiopia are: the legislature (both the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
[HPR] and the House of Federation [HoF]), the executive (especially those 
institutions such as the police, prosecution, prisons who administer civil and 
political rights and those who are in charge of providing public goods and 
services such as education, health, social welfare, clean environment, clean 
water, etc), and the judiciary (which includes the institutions with the 
responsibility to adjudicate cases over constitutional disputes such as the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry [CCI] and HoF)58. Thus, one can note that 
the primary institutions that are custodians of the human rights norms in 
Ethiopia are the mainstream institutions in charge of rights administration. 
The consequence of this is that any attempt at strengthening the institutional 
framework for the better protection of human rights must start with 
strengthening these mainstream institutions.59 
                                           
57 The minutes of the discussion over the draft constitution and at the Transitional 
Council of Representatives indicate that human rights are those one is entitled to 
because he or she is merely human whereas ‘democratic rights’ are those one asserts 
only if and/or because he/she is a citizen. See Minutes of the Discussion on the Draft 
Constitution at the Council of Representatives, May 1994 (Amharic). 
58 The Legislature can make protective laws. Through its budgetary and control powers, 
it can also press the Executive into deference for negative rights and facilitation of the 
enjoyment of positive rights. The Executive, on its part, has the role of respecting 
human rights and preventing violations by others. The Judiciary enforces rights by 
determining entitlements, punishing violators, and by redressing the victims. Usually 
courts are viewed as the custodians of human rights. In Ethiopia, because of their 
limited role in constitutional interpretation, this role is undermined.  
59 Strengthening law enforcement institutions and courts will go a long distance in the 
effort to better human rights protection. 
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In addition to the above mentioned institutions, one can refer to the 
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the Institution of the 
Ombudsperson, and some similar institutions as special bodies that serve as 
‘patrons’ of the human right norms in Ethiopia. It is important to stress that 
these institutions have a secondary role compared to the role of the 
mainstream rights administration institutions60.  The EHRC, for instance, is 
an institution whose promotional task looms larger than its protection and 
remedial tasks61. Besides, one notes--based on the law promulgated to 
establish the Commission, Proclamation No. 210/2000--that it attends to a 
systemic problem rather than specific cases which might be taken as 
aberrations.  Moreover, it is crucial to note that the sanction that the HRC (or 
the Institution of the Ombudsperson) has at its disposal is the mobilization of 
shame on institutions that perpetrate abuse (or neglect) of rights through 
publicizing a report while also doing the best it can to liaison with 
institutions working towards securing relief to specific victims of abuse. 
Considering these factors, it is only safe to conclude that these institutions 
serve as consciences of the system prodding the system into doing more 
towards a better protection of human rights in Ethiopia. They serve as 
lubricants to the system that might run coarse as a result of being overworked 
and/or mindlessness emanating from being bogged down by the routine of 
government machinery. 
This said, we should not neglect the important role of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and their immense contributions towards the 
betterment of human rights situations62. These institutions help in fostering 
the human rights culture (through training, education, and dissemination of 
information—although universities and higher educational institutions also 
share this responsibilities), in invigorating the state commitment to the human 
rights values (through technical assistance and capacity building schemes), 
and in making interventions to facilitate the enjoyment of some rights by the 
                                           
60 We should always keep in mind that these institutions cannot replace the mainstream 
institutions such as the courts; they can only complement the work of these institutions.  
61 See Frans Viljoen, “Mechanisms for Realising Rights under the Bill of Rights” in Nel 
and Bezuidenhout (eds), Policing and Human Rights (2nd ed). Lansdowne: Juta &Co, 
2002. Pp. 75-83 for a discussion of the various mechanisms used for realizing human 
rights under the South African Constitution. 
62 This is in addition to non-judicial institutions such as the office of the Public Defender, 
other commissions (e.g. the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission), etc. See 
also Viljoen, supra note 57 p. 79 on the role of civil societies (e.g. Trade Unions, 
Newspapers, churches) and NGOs, etc.  
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public (such as through counselling and legal aid services to victims, through 
conducting policy research and lobbying, etc)63. 
As has been hinted at earlier on, the constitution seems to distinguish 
between two “classes” or clusters of rights, namely “Human” and 
“Democratic”. Most civil and political rights such as the right to life (arts 14 
and 15), liberty (arts 14 and 17), security of the person (arts 14 and 16), rights 
against torture, slavery, forced labour and related vices (art 18), rights of 
arrested (art 19), accused (art 20) , and detained (art 21) persons, rights 
against retroactive laws (art 22), double jeopardy( art 23), rights to honour 
and reputation (art 24), equality (art. 25), privacy (art 26), religion, belief, and 
opinion (art 27), and rights against crimes against humanity (art 28) are all 
enumerated in “part one” which is a category of “Human Rights”.  
Other rights such as those to thought, opinion, and expression (art. 29), 
assembly, demonstration, and petition (art 30), association (art 31), movement 
(art 32), nationality [alias citizenship] (art 33), marital, personal, and family 
rights (art 34), access to justice (art 37), vote and be voted for (art 38), 
property (art 40), economic, social, and cultural rights (art. 41), dignified 
labour (art 42), development (art 43), environment (Art 44), rights of women 
(art.35), children (art 36), and nations, nationalities, and peoples [alias 
organic collectivities] (art 39) are enumerated under “Part Two”, the part 
rubricated as “Democratic Rights”. 
Considering the list of rights in the two parts of chapter three, one 
quickly notices the fact that traditional civil and political rights are rampant in 
both parts although most economic, social, and cultural rights are found in 
part two. So, it seems that there is not much of a method into the 
classification.  (The ‘received’ wisdom with regard to the rationale behind the 
division is that while ‘human’ rights are entitlements bestowed on us by 
virtue of our being human, ‘democratic’ rights are rights we claim only as a 
consequence of our being members of a political community (i.e., citizens). 
Of interest to us is the fact that no matter where a right is placed, there hardly 
is any consequence flowing from it as there is no hierarchy among rights.  
2.3-Twin Pitfalls: Cynicism and Fundamentalism 
Having noted the normative and institutional framework for human rights in 
Ethiopia, it is important to underscore the need to avoid the twin mistakes 
often made in relation to the call for a more robust implementation of human 
rights laws (or lack thereof), namely that of fundamentalism and cynicism. 
                                           
63 A host of NGOs involve in these kinds of tasks (e.g. counselling, legal aid, and mostly 
training). 
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Human rights fundamentalism, poised as it is to view human rights as 
religion, tends to manifest a mood that breeds dogmatism. Human rights 
cynicism, poised as it is to view human rights as mere rhetoric and politics, 
tends to manifest a mood of despair. We need to avoid both64. We need to be 
optimistic enough to keep doing what we can to respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfil all human rights always. But we also need to be realistic enough to 
expect neglect and abuse of human rights in an imperfect world that suffers 
from constraints of diverse sorts. In particular, we need to note that in their 
exercise human rights are bound to be limited, especially by governmental 
bodies. But so doing must always be done in accordance with a law 
promulgated as necessary in a democratic society, guided by the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others and to promote the general welfare 
within the context of peace, order, safety and security.  
3. Making Legal Sense of Human Rights 
3.1- Human Rights: From Political Rhetoric to Legal Reality 
In order to make a legal sense of human rights, it is imperative that we move 
away from the platitudes of political rhetoric to the vagaries of legal reality. 
                                           
64 These two pitfalls seem to be part of David Kennedy’s “two related dangers of human 
rights work,” namely “the tendency toward idolatry, toward enchanting the tools  and 
norms of practitioners of human rights” and “the tendency toward pragmatism,” the 
preoccupation with the “tools of policy analysis, instrumental reason and savvy 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of human rights initiatives.” Kennedy prescribes 
pragmatism for the dangers of idolatry and “a return to ethics”—idolatry—for an 
excessive pragmatism. See his, “Two Sides of the Coin: Human Rights Pragmatism and 
Idolatry” (Keynote Address at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Rights of the 
London School of Economics, 24 March 2006) (italics mine), available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk last accessed in July 2009. See also Michael Ignatieff who seems 
to be sensitive to these two pitfalls when he speaks of human rights “as politics and 
idolatry” arguing for a more modest agenda for human rights. He argues that human 
rights must not become idolatry, and that we should balance our idealism with a sense 
of practical reality. See his, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Amy Gutmann, ed). 
Princeton: Princeton University, 2001, chs 2, and 3.  In a call for what Anthony 
Dworkin called “a human rights realism”, Ignatieff admonished us not to regard human 
rights “as a secular religion” which tends to be morally self-righteous and rhetorically 
over-reaching. See Dworkin, “Human Rights Realism: A Review of Michael Ignatieff’s 
Recent Book, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,” available at: 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/books/reviews/20011019_dworkin.html, last accessed in 
August 2009.This realism that Ignatieff calls for come out increasingly more strongly 
and forcefully in his more recent books such as The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an 
Age of Terror. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005 and American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Michael Ignatieff, ed). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005. 
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For this, we have to identify specific measures that need to be taken at the 
various steps in the process of realizing a particular right. These measures 
may vary from those that help legalize human rights (i.e., press what are 
essentially moral rights into legal ones) to those that help actually make them 
exercisable by litigating them in court. 
3.1.1-Steps in Making Sense of Human Rights 
Converting moral claims into legal rights requires a process of concretization 
of rights so that first and foremost the rights secure a constitutional guarantee 
in the legal system. Assuming that the constitution is the supreme law of the 
land, such incorporation in the constitution helps entrench human rights so 
that they are granted an elevated but also a foundational position in the legal 
system. The constitutional position helps impose a specific obligation on the 
state. In their best, they form a set of ideals that limit the power of 
government. Once constitutional guarantee is secured, it is important that for 
their protection, legislative framework is designed. Both horizontal and 
vertical violations can be put to account only if there is a legislative 
protection. The process of concretization becomes more robust when it is 
backed by judicial application especially in the face of violation. The 
concretization becomes complete when there is a possibility that, once a 
judicial pronouncement is made on the legitimacy, content, and scope of the 
right, there is a sanction entailed to violation through executive 
implementation. When there is a commitment and will often on the part of 
law enforcement officials to see to it that violators are penalized and victims 
are provided with the commensurate remedy, then we say the process towards 
making legal sense of human rights is set and on course. Then, of course, we 
also say we have come to see all the steps in concretization: from 
constitutional guarantee to legislative protection to judicial application, and 
finally, to executive implementation.  
In the course of protecting human rights in a domestic setting, the tasks 
that are involved can thus be summarized as follows: a) constitutional 
guarantee; b) legislative protection; c) judicial application; and d) executive 
implementation. These tasks entail a process of concretization of the principle 
of sanctity of human rights. One can also call it a process of progressive 
legitimation of interests in a legal system65. Constitutional guarantee is about 
extending recognition to a particular right in the most fundamental law of a 
                                           
65 Tsegaye Regassa, “Courts and the Human Rights Norm in Ethiopia” in Tsegaye 
Regassa and Assefa Fiseha (eds), Courts and the Constitution: Proceedings of a 
Symposium on Courts and the Enforcement of the Constitution, June 2000. Addis 
Ababa: Ethiopian Civil Service College, 2001. 
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polity. This helps to grant a more elevated status to the right as a consequence 
of which restriction, suspension, or deviation from it becomes difficult, if not 
totally impossible. Legislative protection ensures that no (horizontal or even 
vertical) violation can occur with impunity. Thus, this task of state usually 
incurs the duty to proscribe any act or omission that poses a threat to rights. 
Judicial application gives an assurance that in cases of violations, there is a 
possible remedy (or redress) by taking one’s cases to courts. Executive 
implementation relates to the certainty that all judicial injunctions and orders 
that vindicate one’s rights are to be heeded to thereby leading to an actual 
redress for the victim and a real sanction on the perpetrator of the violation or 
abuse. All these tasks are inter-related and interdependent one on the other. 
From the above, one can see that the task of any state that takes human rights 
seriously is a stupendous one.  
3.1.2-Making Legal Sense of Human Rights: Levels of Protection 
Protection of human rights is done at various levels requiring various tasks 
and involving various steps. The levels of “protection” are often expressed in 
terms familiar in the fields of international human rights law such as the duty 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil. The duty to respect requires that we do 
not abuse rights or act to prohibit or deny the right in anyway. In other words, 
the duty to respect entails an ethic of non-interference. The duty to protect 
requires that we act in order to prevent violation or abuse of rights by others 
in the society. This duty might entail the duty to act at the legislative, 
executive, and judicial level in a state. This duty involves the power to 
proscribe abusive or violative acts or omissions. On occasions, it might also 
involve the provision of (judicial, administrative, or other) remedies in the 
face of violations although providing remedies is mainly in the realm of 
enforcing rights. 
The duty to promote entails the responsibility to propagate the notion of 
rights (and the sanctity thereof) to the wider society. It includes the 
responsibility to translate human rights instruments into local vernaculars; 
publication and dissemination of such instruments; organizing sensitization 
programs; running awareness trainings; expanding (formal and informal) 
human rights education; conducting researches on specific areas of concern; 
advocating advancement of the human rights cause in the public sphere; 
networking with communities, civil society organizations, academics, 
activists, and local, national, regional, and international actors; identification 
of “pathological” spots  where  rights deficits are visible with a view to 
preparing necessary legal instruments (or bills); working in collaboration with 
diverse institutions of the state thereby offering assistance in the area of 
capacity building both technical and infrastructural); cooperation with 
business institutions to encourage them to care for human rights as they go 
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about investing and trading;  and others. In short, at this level, massification 
of the knowledge of human rights is done. 
The duty to enforce imposes responsibilities much like the ones that the 
duty to protect entails. It involves the need to redress the victim as much as to 
punish the violator. This duty often requires strong administrative, judicial, 
and law enforcement organs that can impartially and efficiently work towards 
redressing the victim and penalizing the violator. Strong, effective and non-
corrupt police and security force; strong, impartial judiciary66; and efficient 
and neutral civil service and administration are the sine qua non of the duty to 
enforce human rights. 
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights (and development-
related rights in general), the levels at which to protect human rights are 
generally similar but with a slight difference, especially with regard to the 
duty to fulfil.  To respect, for example, development related rights, the duty-
bearer should not interfere with all the “instrumental freedoms” that facilitate 
the generation and preservation, for instance, of means of livelihood. Thus the 
duty-bearer does well not to restrict liberty, movement, privacy, expression, 
assembly, association, private property, free choice of work, etc. To protect, 
the duty-bearer is expected to come up with a legal and policy framework that 
facilitates access to “economic facilities” [alias resources such as land, 
market, etc; regulate quality, adequacy, and prices, etc] and “social facilities” 
[alias education, health, and others]; etc67. To promote such rights, the duty-
bearer does whatever it would do to promote other human rights. To fulfil, the 
duty-bearer undertakes the task of financing the provision of the rights. 
3.2- Steps in Making Judicial Sense of Human Rights: 
Procedural Matters, Substantive Matters, Remedial Matters 
For lawyers, the steps towards enforcement of human rights via litigation in a 
judicial institution require that they first deal with procedural steps in which 
they settle issues relating to jurisdiction (question of whether the court has 
competence), standing (question of whether the party has a vested interest), 
and justiciability (whether the matter is adjudicable in court). Secondly, once 
                                           
66 The UN admonishes us in this regard through its Basic Principles on the Independence 
of the Judiciary (UNHCHR, 1985), adopted by the 7th Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August-6 September 1985, and endorsed 
by the General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 
December 1985. These principles set the standards for independence of judiciary, 
although they are merely hortatory in their consequences. 
67 Terms such as “instrumental freedoms”, “economic”, and “social” “facilities” are all 
borrowed from Sen, supra note 26.  
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they have overcome the challenges of procedural matters, they deal with 
interpretation (trying to settle issues related to the establishment of the 
content and scope of the right). Thirdly, they deal with matters related to 
remedies.68 A brief set of comments is in order on each step. 
Procedural Steps: at this stage, the litigant tries to establish, inter alia, 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal over his/her case. The standing of the parties 
(i.e., whether they have a cause of action, or a vested interest) is assessed and 
determined at this stage. The issue of justiciability is also settled at this stage 
of the proceedings. At this stage, the lawyer does well to make sure that the 
right is ripe (i.e., not too early) and not moot (i.e., not so late as to become 
merely academic or inconsequential) and that the right is process-able in 
court. 
Substance: Determining the Content and Scope of Rights: This is the 
stage where the content and scope of the right is determined. It is at this stage 
that we make an interpretation of the text that embodies the right trying to 
determine the scope of the right along with its limitations, if it entails any. It 
is also at this stage that the usual subject-object-addressee analysis is done 
with a view to fleshing out the exact meaning of the right and the duties it 
entails. 
Remedy Matters: After establishing the content and scope of a right, then 
comes the stage where we have to decide on the remedy or relief sought by 
the victim of the abuse. At this stage, it is decided that abuses or violations be 
discontinued, violative laws, decisions, acts, and practices be annulled, 
redress (be it in the form of compensation or in the form of a free exercise of 
the rights) be enforced. 
It is important to note that when we worked our way through these 
stages, then we can rightly say that we have taken the necessary steps towards 
making a judicial sense of human rights in order for citizens to realize the 
rights that are constitutionally promised to them. 
3.3-Application of Human Rights Provisions: Direct and 
Indirect 
Normally, in order to make human rights justiciable, a clause is inserted to the 
effect that it is resolved as to how the human rights chapter is to be applied in 
the legal system. Thus, constitutions predetermine if the human rights chapter 
                                           
68 These are more or less the steps taken in systems where human rights are rendered 
constitutionally justiciable and entrenched in a legal system. South Africa is a shining 
example of this kind of system. See, for example, De Waal, J., Currie, I., and Erasmus, 
G., The Bill of Rights: Handbook (4th ed). Landowne: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2001. 
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is going to have a direct application, i.e. to be directly applied to cases in 
court proceedings as a special regime of law entailing a special regime of 
remedies. The more frequent practice is that the constitutions allow an 
indirect application, i.e., application of the human rights chapter not directly 
to cases that are presented before a court but rather as tools that indirectly 
influence laws, decisions, actions, and practices. In situations where indirect 
application is opted for, the human rights chapter permeates the system from 
behind. It impacts the laws, decisions, policies, actions, and practices in such 
a way that they take account of the sanctity of human rights. Thus the human 
rights chapter serves as a framework of understanding, a tool of 
interpretation, a guide to public decision-making, and a threshold for public 
behaviour. In other words, it serves as the spirit that propels the system in the 
direction of better sensitivity to human rights. Thus, in practice, the human 
rights chapter serves as the standard against which the propriety (i.e., the 
constitutionality) of laws, decisions, actions, and practices are measured. 
They serve as one of the grounds based on which we annul a certain law, 
decision, action or practice for unconstitutionality. It is important to note that 
in the case of indirect application, the human rights chapter will get 
implemented through the instrumentality of other laws or decisions made in 
tune with the ethos of human rights. 
In the FDRE Constitution, the issue of application is dealt with under art 
13 (1) which reads as follows: “All Federal and State legislative, executive, 
and judicial organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to 
respect and enforce the provisions of this chapter.” One can see from this 
article that it spells out the principal duty bearers to be the state organs69. But 
it does not tell us about whether we go for direct or indirect application. But 
since not all organs of government are involved in the task of adjudication, 
there obviously is no chance for them to directly apply chapter three to 
resolve a dispute. It is thus safe to conclude that while courts might be 
expected to face the challenge of direct application, much less is expected of 
the other two organs. Nevertheless, it is clear that by virtue of indirect 
application, all organs are expected to be mindful of human rights in all their 
decisions and actions as they go about discharging their daily responsibilities. 
                                           
69 Indeed, one can say that article 13(1) is merely a statement of the reach of application 
of the provisions of chapter three, i.e. a statement as to who is bound by the obligations 
emanating from the chapter. Consequently, from a strict reading of the provision, one 
quickly notes that non-state actors are not so bound. But note the argument from art 
9(2) which, by assigning the responsibility to obey and ensure observance of the 
constitution (including chapter three) to “all citizens, organs of state, political 
organizations, other associations as well as their officials”, tends to extend the reach to 
state and non-state actors alike. 
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3.4- Determining the Content and Scope of Rights: Towards 
a Subject-Object-Addressee Analysis 
Determining the content and scope of rights requires the making of a subject-
object-addressee analysis. In order to make a successful subject-object-
addressee analysis of any right, the core questions we ought to ask are the 
following: 
a) Who is the subject of right, i.e., who is the beneficiary? 
b) What is the content and scope of the rights? What is it that the beneficiary 
can rightfully claim? What is the substance of the entitlement sought? 
(Conversely, what is the demand that rights impose on the body 
responsible for their protection?) What is the limit, if any, to the exercise 
of a particular right or set of rights? In other words, what is the object of 
the right? Associated with these set of questions is also the question 
regarding remedies. Thus we ask: “What can a beneficiary do in the face 
of neglect or abuse of his/her rights? What remedies can be sought? And 
how” 
c) Who is the duty- bearer? To whom are they addressed? From whom can 
one claim the right? Against whom can we assert the rights? In short, who 
is the addressee? 
These questions help to make a subject-object-addressee analysis of any 
human rights we seek to exercise. The subjects (i.e. the beneficiaries) are 
identified by the universality-marking words such as words “Everyone…”, 
“Every person,” “No one shall be…,” “All persons…” or particularity-
marking words such as “Every citizen…”,  “Persons arrested…”,  “Accused 
persons…”, “Women…”, “Every child…”, “Every nation, nationality, and 
people in Ethiopia”, “Ethiopian farmers and pastoralists”, “Workers…”, etc. 
The addressee is easily identifying by referring mainly to the application 
clause namely art 13(1). The object (the content and scope of the right) is 
understood from a close reading of each rights provision which, subject to 
variation from right to right, imposes a duty to respect, protect, or enforce 
and/or fulfil. This kind of analysis in turn helps to turn human rights from 
mere rhetoric to legally consumable commodities. In short, it enhances their 
justiciability and enforceability. These questions need to be asked in a more 
pointed manner especially in relation to the right to economic, social and 
cultural rights and the right to development as they help to overcome the 
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3.5-Limitations on the Exercise of Human Rights 
In spite of the claim to universality and inalienability, human rights are not 
exercised in an absolute manner70. There is a limitation imposed on the 
exercise of rights for the sake of making an optimal “utilization” or 
enjoyment of rights71. But “What are limitations? Why are they imposed? 
When? What forms do they take? And how are they imposed?” are all 
questions that need to be answered in order to clarify our view of human 
rights further. 
Limitations are lawful infringements of rights72. They are acceptable or 
‘justifiable’ violations. They are deviations from the standard manner of 
dealing with rights imposed primarily to facilitate optimal use or exercise of 
rights in a context of scarce public resources, space, and time. Societies need 
to impose limits (not as a matter of luxury but as a matter of necessity) to 
overcome constraints imposed primarily by scarcity. Sometimes one has to 
limit the exercise of rights in order to overcome the excesses produced by the 
conflictive nature of rights as between themselves73. Thus limitations can also 
be viewed as harmonization schemes74, mechanisms through which we 
mediate between competing rights of different types or intended to be 
exercised by different beneficiaries. 
Limitations become especially necessary when disaster strikes as a 
consequence of natural catastrophe, war, and epidemic, general breakdown in 
the provision of public goods and services, breakdown of law and order, civil 
strife, or terrorist attacks, and others. These circumstances put a strain on the 
                                           
70 Gordon Hollamby, “The Limitation Clause” in Nel, F. and Bezuidenhout (eds), 
Policing and Human Rights (2nd ed). Lansdowne: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2002, pp 103-118. 
Here, Hollamby says, “Human rights are not absolute: they can be limited or 
circumscribed.” He also says, “it is trite that virtually no right, whether entrenched or 
not, can be absolute: its boundaries must be set by the rights and freedoms and the 
interests of others.” I would argue otherwise as follows: while human rights can be 
absolute in essence, their exercise and/or enjoyment cannot be as absolute given the fact 
that we live in a world burdened with scarcity of resources (e.g. space, time, finances, 
etc). Hollamby’s positioning of human rights as non-absolute makes the inviolability 
claim vulnerable. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Only the legality makes limitations different from outright violations. 
73 Rights tend to compete with, and confront, each other. The state does the balancing 
through limitative laws.  
74 Hollamby, supra note 70. 
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modes of exercise of rights as a consequence of which limitations of a special 
type, i.e., derogation and suspension, become necessary75.  
Limitations can take various forms such as restriction, suspension, or 
derogation from. Each of these forms affects the exercise of rights in different 
ways and to a varying degree. Thus restrictions circumscribe the manner, or 
place, and the extent to which rights can be enjoyed or exercised in a 
particular set of circumstances, often in normal times. Suspension leads to the 
temporary non-application of one or more rights because of an unusual 
difficulty in which a state finds itself. Derogation refers to the possibility of 
acting in a manner deviating from the accepted standards of behaviour vis-a-
vis rights. It entails acting like there are no human rights at all76. The latter 
two come into play in extra-normal situations. 
But there are limits to limits. Limitations imposed on the exercise of 
rights are not without limits77. How are they imposed? When are they 
imposed? The answers to these questions clarify the fact that, in a rational 
society78, limits cannot be imposed arbitrarily. Thus it is often underscored 
that limitations should meet the requirements of the principles of: a) legality; 
b) necessity; c) rationality; d) proportionality; and e) sanctity of life, dignity, 
and equality.  
In other words, in order to fulfil the requirements of legality, all 
limitations need to be imposed through the instrumentality of a law that is 
procedurally and substantively legitimate. Also, the law issued must be 
necessary in a democratic (i.e., open and tolerant) society. It is said necessary 
when the existence of a country is likely to be shaken to the core, or the 
system is so destabilized as to lead to a crisis in governance. Thus, limitative 
laws are said to be necessary if the exercise of the right is a threat to public 
order, public morals, public health, public peace, safety and security, or to the 
                                           
75 Note that although they are of the same species, limitations in the strict sense are not 
the same as derogations and suspensions. The word “limitation” can be used as a 
generic name that, within it, has restrictions, suspensions, and derogations as species of 
limitation. While they are similar to this extent, they are not the same. Limitations are 
often those imposed in normal times, whereas suspensions and derogations are those 
imposed in emergency situations. See Hollamby, Ibid, p.106. 
76 Acting as if human rights do not exist, or no bill of rights exists, because the exigencies 
of the time force them to act the way they do. 
77 One cannot be arbitrary in imposing limits. One needs to be reasonable, justified, 
effective (i.e., giving effect to the nature and purport of the right), and proportionate. 
78 A rational society, being a democratic society, operates on the basis of the doctrine of 
the Rule of Law where, among other things, citizens have the right to written reasons. 
See De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, supra note 63 on this right in South Africa. 
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rights and freedoms of others79. Moreover, in order to fulfil the requirements 
of rationality, one must establish the existence of a cause-effect relationship 
between the exercise of the right and the impending harm, and/or between the 
limitative action and the impending harm intended to be prevented by such 
action. The requirement of proportionality is met through comparing the 
impending harm intended to be prevented on the one hand and the gravity of 
the limitative action or decision on the other80. The length of time during 
which the limitation stays in force, the physical area within the bounds of 
which limitation is imposed, the kind of rights that are restricted, suspended 
or derogated from, etc should be considered to in order to weigh 
proportionality. And ALWAYS, limitations cannot be imposed to defy the 
sanctity of life, dignity, and equality of all human beings. One can limit rights 
without subjecting a person to humiliating and degrading treatment or 
punishment, or without discriminating against them arbitrarily, or without 
taking their lives without due process of law.81 
In Ethiopia, there is no separate provision in the Constitution dealing 
with limitations that can be imposed on the exercise of human rights and the 
manner in which these limits can be imposed. The absence of such a general 
‘limitation’ clause might, at first blush, give the impression that human rights 
are not subject to limitation in Ethiopia. But it is important to note that the 
absence might also lead to the arbitrary imposition of limitations giving the 
right holder no recourse to ensure that the limitation is a justified and 
reasonable one.  
Nevertheless, there are specific limitations built into the provisions 
recognizing the rights. These limitation clauses are often known as claw-back 
phrases. And so, some rights such as the right to freedom of religion (art 27), 
expression (art.29), or assembly (art 30) are subject to a specific variety of 
limitations. While the existence of these provisions clarify matters as to how, 
what kind of limitations can be imposed upon the exercise of a particular 
right, there was no way of weighing the legitimacy (or not) of any limitative 
law, measure, decision, or actions. 
In what looks like a basic guideline as to how limitations (i.e., 
derogations and suspensions in this context) are imposed, art 93 of the FDRE 
                                           
79 See Syracusa, Principles on interpreting of limitation clauses; see also the 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 36. 
80 Note that weighing proportionality is about balancing divergent interests based on a 
rights claim. 
81 In most countries death penalty is abolished because it is contrary to the right to life; 
Optional Protocol II of the ICCPR is also about banning death penalty. Note that 
Ethiopia has not yet signed this Protocol. 
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Constitution, regulating the manner of declaration of emergency, stipulates 
the principles of necessity and proportionality (art 93(4)a) as essential in 
times of suspension and derogation of rights. It is remarkable that in the same 
article (93(4) c)), rights that are not subject to any limitation (be it suspension 
or derogation) are listed. These rights are the right against cruel, inhumane 
and degrading treatment or punishment (art 18), right to equality (art 25), and 
self-determination (art 39(1) and 39(2)). The other provision that is not 
subject to suspension or derogation is the provision regarding the name of the 
country (art 1). One notes the conspicuous absence of the right to life from 
among this list of rights82. 
3.6- Interpreting Human Rights Clauses  
Like all laws, laws on human rights (whether they be international 
instruments or domestic constitutions and legislations) are bound to need 
interpretation at one time or another in the course of being utilized. 
Interpretation is one of the most vital steps towards making sense of human 
rights. But “what is interpretation? When do we need to do it, and how?” are 
important questions to address as we discuss interpretation. 
Defined in simple terms—and at the risk of oversimplification— 
interpretation can be viewed as the art of determining the meaning (or 
constructing a meaning out) of a text. We need interpretation when texts (or 
provisions) are not clear.83 Texts are said to be unclear when they are 
ambiguous, silent, apparently inconsistent, or even absurd. In all other cases, 
i.e., when a text’s meaning is clear beyond any disagreement or debate, then 
we proceed to apply it. Apparently, interpretation or construction results (and 
benefits) from disagreement.  
From traditional rules or canons of interpretation84, one notes that when a 
text is ambiguous, i.e., when it is riddled with equivocation that leads to more 
                                           
82 It is interesting to note that some of the state constitutions (e.g. SNNPRS, Oromia, 
Amhara, and Tigray, etc) extend non-derogability to the right of life, security of 
persons; freedom of thought, conscience, and beliefs; the right of detainees and 
prisoners to dignity; the right of every human person to recognition as such; and even 
the right to one’s honor and reputation.  
83 The idea is that when texts are clear, the interpreter applies the text to the facts of the 
case. But one quickly notes the difficulty of resolving the issue of how—and by whom-
- we determine whether a particular text is clear or not. This issue invites a meta-
interpretive (pre-interpretive) discourse which is inevitable whether we tackle it 
explicitly or tacitly. 
84 See, for example, V.H.Patil, “General Rules of Statutory Interpretation,” IT Review 
(July 2001) for a discussion in the context of India. See also Avitar Singh, Introduction 
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than one meaning to be ascribed to it, we use various techniques to overcome 
the ambiguity. In principle, literal interpretation85 is taken. Thus we look for 
the literal meaning of the word or phrase that is ambiguous. For this 
etymological definition86 and dictionary definitions87 might help so that we 
can define the ambiguous term as an ordinary person would understand it. 
When literal interpretation is not helping to overcome the ambiguity, we 
proceed to use contextual interpretation, i.e., interpretation by looking at the 
words or phrases or provisions or sections or texts that come before and after 
(the antecedents and subsequents of) the ambiguous word. When textual 
context fails, we look into historical, social, or political, context (as the case 
may be) so that we can embellish the word and make sense out of it. If the 
context fails us, then we proceed to give effect to the meaning intended by the 
makers of the document. To find ‘legislative intent’ as it is often termed, we 
are advised to read the minutes of the meetings, the debates, the preliminary 
drafts, etc. When the ambiguity sticks even after this, we resort to a positive 
interpretation, i.e., interpretation to give effect to the general poise of the law. 
The latter is also associated with purposive (teleological) interpretation.88 
When a law is silent, analogical interpretation is employed to fill the gap left 
open by the silence. 
When a law is absurd, or contrary to the demands of reason, common 
sense and human justice, then we resort to reason, natural justice, and equity. 
More importantly, we look into the spirit of the law (the motive that inspired 
the law in the first place) so that the literal application of the law might not 
end up in being self-defeating. It is in these circumstances that teleological 
interpretation might also be resorted to.  
When a law is inconsistent, first we need to determine the nature of 
inconsistency. If it is inter-temporal, then we go for the more recent law.89 If 
                                                                                                         
to Interpretation of Statutes (Reprint Ed). Agra/Delhi: Wadhwa and Co., 2007 for an 
extended discussion of interpretation, albeit chiefly from an Indian perspective. 
85 Literal interpretation demands strict fidelity to the letter of the law. 
86 Etymological definition is definition by resorting to the origin and/or root of the word.  
87 Dictionary definitions normally give us meanings of words in the way they are 
understood by lay people. But professional dictionaries can give us more technical uses 
of terms. 
88 Purposive interpretation is used to give effect to the purpose of the provision. 
Teleological interpretation relates to the attempt to obtain meaning by resorting to the 
end (telos) of a rule (or a right). 
89 Inter-temporal conflict among laws is conflict between old and new laws. In such 
instances, the new prevails over the old. Hence, the principle lex posteriori derogate lex 
priori. 
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it is inter-legal, then we go for the hierarchically superior law.90 If the 
inconsistency is intra-legal, then we go for the special provision,91 unless it is 
violative of the most sacred of principles therein.  
If, having considered all these techniques of interpretation, we still 
remain with doubts as to how to go about doing it, then we adhere to the 
dictum, in dubio, pro libertate, i.e., in case of doubt decide in favour of 
liberty92. 
Anyone acquainted with interpretation of texts is familiar with the idea 
that much of the interpretive task is coloured by the identity of the 
interpreter.93 As a result, there is a debate on who has to interpret 
constitution,94 at what level, and following what modes. Owing to the 
extensive, intensive and intractable nature of that debate even in Ethiopia,95 I 
opt to omit the discussion of that debate in this article. 
In international human rights law, interpretation is advised to be done in 
such a way that no interpretation is contrary to the effective utilization of the 
right recognized in various instruments96. In this regard, it suffices to note, for 
                                           
90 Inter-legal conflict exists when there is conflict between laws of varying status. In such 
cases, we give effect to the hierarchically superior law. 
91 Intra-legal conflict is that which exists between laws of the same status but varying 
degree of generality or specificity. In these situations, the special prevails over the 
general. Hence, the principle lex specialis derogat lex generalibus. 
92 This is often termed as liberal interpretation, liberal because it is in favour of 
rights/liberties. 
93 Partly this is because interpretation involves construction not only in line with the 
context of the intent of the author but also with the perspective and context of the 
reader. 
94 The debate gets expression in relation to whether, and to what extent, a state should 
adopt judicial review. 
95 The debate in Ethiopia is as to whether and to what extent the ordinary courts are left 
with the power to interpret the constitutional provisions on human rights given the 
textual fact (as per art 62 of the FDRE Constitution) that one of the tasks of the House 
of Federation (HoF) is constitutional interpretation. This debate has been part of the 
2000 symposium at ECSC on courts and human rights. See Tsegaye Regassa and 
Assefa Fiseha supra note 60. See arts 62, 82-84 of the FDRE constitution. See also 
Proclamations No. 250 and 251 of 2001. For an interesting recent discussion on this, 
see Yonatan Tesfaye, “Whose Power is it anyway?”Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 22, 
No 1(2008). For a more trenchant discussion on the debate regarding interpretation of 
human rights provisions, see Tsegaye Regassa, “What does it Mean, Who Says it, and 
Why does it Matter?: Interpreting Human Rights Provisions of the Ethiopian 
Constitution”(forthcoming 2009). 
96 Art 30 of the UDHR maintains that “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as 
implying for any state, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
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example, art 30 of the UDHR which stresses the need to do interpretation in a 
way that is not subversive of any of the rights recognized therein. 
As has been hinted at repeatedly, interpretation of the human rights 
chapter is key to an effective protection and enforcement of human rights. 
This is mainly because it is through interpretation that we determine the 
content, scope, and limitation of a particular human right. The questions as to 
what interpretation is, when we need it, and how do we do it, are very crucial 
in the discussion on interpretation of a human rights text. These questions 
prefigured in the more lengthy discussion above regarding interpretation in 
general. We now turn to a discussion of the Ethiopian scenario. 
In Ethiopia, the supposedly interpretation clause of art 13(2) does not say 
much as to the who, the when, and the how of interpretation of chapter three. 
Art 13(2) says: “The fundamental rights and freedoms specified in this 
Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human 
Rights and international instruments adopted by Ethiopia.” Apart from telling 
us the need to ensure our interpretations are in conformity with the principles 
of the International Bill of Rights (IBR), this article does not tell us as to 
whose responsibility it is to interpret, when we need interpretation, how 
(based on what principles and techniques) we should interpret it, etc. The 
result is that we are still in a state of confusion as to the proper mode, method, 
principle, and technique of interpretation of not only the human rights chapter 
but also the entire constitution in Ethiopia. This problem is accentuated 
especially because there is no comprehensive rule of (statutory) interpretation 
in the legal system—which has resulted in lack of consistency in ordinary 
legal interpretation in the legal system. (In recent times, partly out of the 
concern for this interpretive fragmentation, a law is issued to make the 
decisions of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court binding on 
other similar cases on matters of legal interpretation.97) 
So, the question remains: how do we interpret the provisions of chapter 
three? But first: who interprets it? This is a very difficult question bound to 
raise a lot of controversies. The reason it is so wedded into controversies is 
because of the atypical mode of constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia: The 
House of the Federation (HoF) is in charge of adjudicating all constitutional 
disputes (art.62 cum 83 of the FDRE constitution and Proc. 251/2001). The 
Constitutional Inquiry Council (CCI) looks into and examines cases and 
                                                                                                         
perform any act aimed at the  destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth 
herein.”  
97 See Proclamation No. 457/2005. 
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presents its recommendations to the HoF for a final decision (art 84). One can 
thus argue that the human rights chapter of the constitution is also to be 
interpreted by none but the HoF (of course with the advisory support of the 
CCI). One can also argue for a judicial interpretation of the provisions of 
chapter three on the basis of an argument that takes the following format: a) 
interpretation of laws, including the constitution, is the cardinal task of the 
courts; b) the constitution in general and the human rights chapter in 
particular is a law that is subject to judicial interpretation unless it is explicitly 
provided otherwise; c) there is no explicit prohibition of judicial 
interpretation although there is the explicit recognition of the mandate of the 
HoF in this regard98. 
In practice, courts do interpret the provisions of chapter three that pertain 
to criminal procedural rights that are found in the Criminal Code and 
Criminal Procedure Code (often without making any reference to the 
constitution).99 But the courts do not have a principled, consciously designed, 
and directed, manner of going about the task of interpretation. Whoever 
interprets the Constitution and, by extension, the human rights chapter, there 
are some widely applicable techniques of (legal) interpretation that one must 
heed to.100 These are:  
a) That it must be established that there is a degree of unclarity (caused by 
ambiguity, inconsistency, silence and/or absurdity)  that invites 
interpretation; 
b) That when the cause is ambiguity, a literal (textual, contextual) 
interpretation is made often by also considering the legislative intent, 
purpose (teleos), and spirit;  
c) That when the cause is inconsistency, first we establish the nature of 
inconsistency (whether it is inter-legal or inter-temporal); and when the 
conflict is between hierarchically related laws, then we decide in favour 
                                           
98 This kind of argument helps to judicialize the interpretive task. 
99 Apparently so doing is merely legal interpretation or application, rather than 
constitutional interpretation. 
100 In the business of interpretation, the first thing to do is to establish that there is 
unclarity in the law. The second thing to do is to identify the cause of unclarity. 
Thirdly, we must carefully choose the principles, theories, methods, canons, and/or 
techniques that are appropriate to help solve the problem of unclarity. Fourthly, we 
need to apply the principles, theories, methods, canons, and/or techniques of 
interpretation chosen to be applicable in step three to the facts in the case at hand. 
Finally, we need to write out the judgement, the decisions, and the orders--as the case 
may be—in a manner that discloses the reasons for the chosen steps and formulae of 
interpretation. 
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of the superior law; when the conflict is between general and specific 
types of laws, the specific law prevails; if the conflict is between old laws 
and new laws, the new laws, the more recent laws, prevails over the old 
laws; 
d) That when the law is silent, we construct the existing law in such a way 
that it is made to cover the new situation (through what is traditionally 
called analogical interpretation); 
e) That when the law is absurd, we interpret the law through recourse to 
reason, equity, and natural justice to give a positive effect to the spirit and 
end (teleos) of law; and 
f) That if, after all is said and done, the unclarity still persists, then we 
decide in favour of the right (in accord with the dictum: in dubio, pro 
libertate101!). 
3.7- Entrenchment of Human Rights  
Entrenchment has to do with the difficulty associated with amending the 
human rights provisions of an instrument. Often such documents are made to 
be difficult to amend. The reason is because human rights are viewed to have 
enduring value owing to their trans-temporality. As a consequence of their 
enduring value, often the human rights chapters (otherwise known as the Bill 
of Rights Chapters) of constitutions are made hard to amend. The mode of 
formal amendment102 and the procedures thereof are so stringent that no 
ordinary legislature can have its way if it makes an inroad to the list or the 
scope of the rights that are already recognized. Meeting the requirements of 
the procedures for amending ordinary statutes does not suffice to amend a 
constitutional provision apropos of human rights. Thus, often approval of the 
proposed amendment in the legislatures of the constituent units of a 
federation (if the polity is a federation) and a qualified majority of the joint or 
both houses of the national (or federal) legislature is sought in order to effect 
such an amendment.103 In some cases, approval in a referendum might also be 
                                           
101 To mean: in case of doubt, decide in favour of liberty (or freedom=rights). 
102 Formal amendment is amendment done by the body assigned the task of amendment 
sitting for the specific purpose of amending the constitution with the conscious, 
deliberate and intentional effort towards effecting amendment in accordance with the 
procedures constitutionally set for it. See S. N. Ray, Modern Comparative Politics: 
Approaches, Methods, and Issues. New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 2003 pp.116-
129. It is often contrasted with informal amendment, one in which various organs of 
government effect amendment in the course of discharging their daily responsibilities 
(such as law-making, implementing, or interpreting.) 
103 See Arts. 104 and 105 of the FDRE Constitution for instance, especially 105 (1). 
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required.104 All this, it is presumed, is in deference to the trans-temporality 
and the universality of human rights. 
A human rights provision is said to be entrenched when the procedure 
for its amendment is stringent. In Ethiopia, according to Art 105(1), 
amendment to the provisions of chapter three is effected when the following 
requirements are met: 
a) When the proposed amendment is approved by a majority vote of the 
legislatures of all the nine states; 
b) When the federal legislature approves the proposal by a two-thirds 
majority vote; and 
c) When the HoF approves the proposal by a two-thirds majority vote. 
This shows the degree to which the amendment of the “bill of rights” is 
difficult, thereby rendering the constitution one of the most rigid constitutions 
in the world. From this, one can conclude that human rights are fairly 
entrenched in Ethiopia105. It needs to be underscored at this juncture that this 
entrenchment marks the fact that human rights are taken seriously in the 
Ethiopian legal system. 
4. The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting Human Rights 
The role of the judiciary in the protection of human rights is so immense that 
it cannot be exaggerated. Often, they are rightly presented as “the bulwark 
against abusive governmental practices”.106 In most jurisdictions, they are the 
primary bodies to which victims of human rights violations look to obtain 
formal redress. That is perhaps the reason it is often said that “undoubtedly, 
the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms is the objective of all 
courts.”107 Of course one cannot deny that the courts do have shortcomings in 
this role. All its shortcomings notwithstanding, the court’s role in the 
                                           
104 This is the case for example in Australia. See generally Vicki Jackson and Mark 
Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law. New York: Foundation, 1999 on various 
modes of constitutional amendment. 
105 This rigidity, while it is preservative of the list of rights now recognized and is as such 
a good thing, might have a negative consequence in keeping out new set of rights 
which society might deem so important as to deserve inclusion in the constitution. So, 
entrenchment might, in effect, make constitutionalization of new rights difficult. 
106 Lawrence Friedman, “Turning to the Courts: Human Rights before the Bench” (Book 
Review), Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 13 (2000), p. 316. 
107 Khalnar Hajiyev, “The Role of the Constitutional Court and Ordinary Courts in the 
Protection of Human Rights” (Paper presented on a conference on “Human Rights 
Protection Systems”, Bishkek , 21-22 November 2002), p. 3.  
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protection of human rights can never be over stated. In the sections that 
follow, we try to shed light on some of the key roles of the courts in this 
regard by trying to posit its role in the context of the state responsibility 
regarding human rights in general.  
4.1-State Role Regarding Human Rights 
It has already been hinted at the fact that state role can be classified into three 
categories, namely that of respect, protect, and fulfil. The duty to respect 
requires that the state does nothing to adversely affect the free exercise and 
enjoyment of rights by citizens. The duty to protect requires making 
protective laws, setting up protective institutions, employing qualified 
protective professional actors, allocating the necessary wherewithal (noting 
that rights are very expensive), and procuring the necessary logistical and 
infrastructural facilities. The duty to fulfil requires the state to go beyond the 
call of ordinary duties to ensure that citizens are capacitated to enjoy their 
rights. It calls for compassion of the highest order (the kind which says I am 
my brother’s keeper, I am my sister’s keeper) from the part of the state to 
make sure that especially the more unfortunate sections of our societies are 
brought to the level where they can enjoy a decent life of dignity. The state 
must thus plan and strategize to make sure that citizens are free from want108 
by working towards eradicating such social ills as poverty and illiteracy, and 
by combating those factors that negatively impact their environment and 
peace. 
The judiciary as part of the three major organs of the state, the trias 
politica, is one of those institutions that have these triune duties to respect, to 
protect, and to fulfil the exercise and enjoyment of human rights. In the 
Ethiopian constitution, the courts are identified as one of the three organs of 
the state that have “the responsibility to respect and enforce the provisions of 
this [i.e., the Human rights] chapter.”109 The major brunt of the duty to 
protect, as we shall see shortly, rests on the judiciary. 
 
 
                                           
108 The phrase “free from want” evokes the memory of the Four Freedoms speech of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941 in which he postulated his vision of the world that 
ensures the exercise of freedom of expression and worship and freedom from fear and 
want for all citizens everywhere. 
109 Art 13 (1), the provision regarding state duty for human rights, reads as follows: “All 
Federal and State legislative, executive, and judicial organs at all levels shall have the 
responsibility and duty to respect and enforce the provisions of this chapter.”  
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4.2-The Judiciary and its Roles in General 
The judiciary, being staffed with judges who are viewed as the oracles of the 
law, is primarily the protector of the weak from the strong, the poor from the 
wealthy, and the powerless from the powerful. The protection of “the worst 
and the weakest amongst us” is one of the cardinal duties of the judiciary.  In 
a case decided in the Constitutional Court, Justice P. Chaskalson of South 
Africa is noted to have said the following regarding the eminent role courts 
play in this regard: 
The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the 
power of judicial review of all legislations in the courts, was to protect the 
rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately 
through the democratic process. Those who are entitled to claim this 
protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people of our 
society. It is only if there is willingness to protect the worst and weakest 
amongst us that all of us can be secure that our on rights will be protected110. 
(Italics added) 
In a similar vein, Justice Jerome Frank is reported to have said that “the test 
of the moral quality of a civilization is its treatment of the weak and the 
powerless”111. The judiciary’s primary task is to “to pursue justice”112.  The 
courts have it in their tradition to do justice without fear, favour, or prejudice. 
That is one of the reasons that courts need to be independent. Doing justice in 
the words of one of the prophets of old requires that we “administer true 
justice; show mercy and compassion to one another. Do not oppress the 
widow or the fatherless, the alien or the poor.”113 This pricks our attention to 
the causes of social justice that the instruments on socio-economic and 
cultural rights seek to advance. Needless to say, while the court needs to be 
objective, neutral, and dispassionate in as much as it can, in all its dealings it 
must also side with the truth (of facts) and the soundness of the interpretation 
of the law invoked. The need to be dispassionate should not blunt the need for 
it to be compassionate to the oppressed. 
                                           
110 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) 
111 In what echoes  Frank’s statement, Justice Hugo Black is also reported to have said, 
“The worst citizen no less than the best is entitled to equal protection of the laws of 
his state and of his nation” in Bell v Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) AT 328. 
112 This is also often claimed by professional associations of lawyers e.g. the American 
Bar Association, as their slogan. In deed all lawyers have it in their role to advance 
the horizons of freedom and to aspire toward the ideal of justice.  
113 Zechariah 3: 9-10, Holy Bible (New International Version). Zondervan: Grand Rapids, 
1973/2001 (Rev), p. 525. It is of course noted that to demand the active engagement 
of courts for the cause of social justice is to demand more judicial activism which is 
not equally tolerated in all jurisdictions. 
 
3(2) Mizan Law Rev.                      MAKING LEGAL SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS                           325 
 
 
In the trias politica, the court’s symbol is that of the scales, the scales of 
justice and fairness. It is often contrasted to the legislature, which commands 
the purse, and the executive, which commands the sword. Because it 
commands neither the sword nor the purse, it is said to be the weakest organ 
of state. Its weakness is taken as its strength and often it is given the task of 
watchdog over the powers of the more powerful institutions of the state. As 
Hamilton said in those inimitable words:  
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in 
a capacity to annoy or injure them. … The judiciary, …, has no influence 
over the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or the wealth 
of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be 
said to have neither force nor will but merely judgement; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of 
its judgements. 114 
One of the chief tasks of the judiciary is to normalize politics and bring 
balance to it. In this capacity, it tends to preserve the health of the political 
machine in a polity. It does so by protecting the integrity of the rule of the 
game of politics, i.e., the constitution.115 In most systems, the court serves as 
“the arbiter of what is and what is not legal or constitutional.” The courts are 
often viewed as indispensable to a vibrant democracy. They act as a check to 
politics especially when the latter goes awry. They are the voice of reason, the 
voice of conscience, in a democratic politics that tends to be blinded by the 
voice of passion of the majority. In this, it establishes sanity on the excesses 
of majoritarian democracy. They are custodians of the principle of rule of 
law. In a constitutionalist system that recognizes judicial review, they act as 
the guardians of the values of the constitution, the custodians of the ideals of 
the founding fathers. In this, they have the potential to serve redemptively as 
the voice that calls us back to the ideals the constitutions has set for us. 
Cardinal to the success of their work is their independence (both 
institutionally as a court and personally as judges). This is reinforced by the 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.116 The Basic 
                                           
114 See these timeless words of Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers No 78. 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist Papers (Charles R. Kesler and Clinton 
Rossiter, eds). New York: Mentor, 1969/1999, p. 433. 
115 See Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in 
Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments (4th ed). Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2006, p.86. 
116 UNHCHR, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985). UNGA Res 
40/32 and 40/146 of 1985. The principles represent a global consensus on what 
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Principles describe the seven key components necessary for judicial 
independence as follows: a) guaranteed term of office; b) finality of 
decisions; c) exclusive authority; d) ban against exceptional or military 
courts; e) fiscal autonomy; f) separation of powers; and g) enumerated 
qualifications (e.g. academic qualification, ability, integrity, efficiency, 
etc).117 Indeed, the judiciary’s role as an institution of effective remedy lies in 
its independence. In order to ensure independence, improper influences on 
judges should be prohibited; care must be taken in the proper qualification, 
training and selection of judges; tenure and conditions of service must be 
provided; immunity must be guaranteed; disciplinary measures need to be 
taken only in accordance with the law118. It is also to be noted that the 
technical competence of the judges and the degree to which they bring about 
professionalism and sophistication to the practice of human rights is 
important for the effective protection of rights through the instrumentality of 
the courts. 
4.3- The Judiciary and its Roles in Ethiopia 
The judiciary in Ethiopia has no less important task than the one outlined for 
courts elsewhere. The constitution (in its arts 78-81) recognizes the 
establishment of a three-tiered independent judiciary which is vested with all 
judicial power. Owing to the federal nature of the polity, the establishment of 
state judicial bodies is envisaged by the constitution. Consequently, the states 
have constitutionally established a three-tiered court in their jurisdictions. In 
most states, there are also social courts that are increasingly granted a 
constitutional recognition although they have a dubious position in the 
judicial hierarchy.  The federal supreme court has a cassation division whose 
decisions have an authority and precedential value over lower courts in the 
hierarchy (as of 2005). The state Supreme courts, too, have their own 
cassation divisions whose decisions, however, do not have a similar authority 
over lower courts in the states.  
One of the major features of the Ethiopian judiciary is that it does not 
have the ultimate say on the meaning of the constitution. Nor does it have the 
power to rule over constitutionality of laws. This power is granted to the 
House of Federation cum the CCI (arts 62 cum 82-84). But the courts can 
decide on an issue in which constitutionality of a law is contested without its 
                                                                                                         
judicial independence is and should be. See Linda C. Keith, “Judicial Independence 
and Human Rights Protection in the World” Judicature Vol 85, No 4 (2002) p. 196. 
117 Keith, supra note 107, pp.196-197. 
118 On this, see, for example, OSCE, “Protection and Promotion of Human Rights” 
(Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, 12-13 July 2007, Vienna.) 
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decision having the effect of annulling the law as unconstitutional. The 
perception among most judges and lawyers (as well as the politicians and the 
lay public), however, is that the constitution is beyond the reach of the 
ordinary courts119. But this is simply counter-intuitive because: a) the courts 
have judicial power (art 79(1)); b) judicial power includes the power to find 
and declare the law; c) a law that is repugnant to the constitution is of no 
effect (art 9(1)); d) thus the courts can, in their day-to-day business of 
resolving disputes, can enforce constitutionality without the need to take the 
platform of constitutional interpretation and the need to ban an 
unconstitutional law. This is particularly important in the area of human 
rights law which, although emanations of the constitution, are presented to 
courts couched in the languages of procedural laws (especially that of 
criminal procedure). 
While the significance of the judicial power in the process of normalizing 
politics is less and while its position as the guardian of the constitutional 
values is even less, the courts in Ethiopia, like everywhere else, have the 
important responsibility of doing justice without fear, favour, or prejudice. 
They have the responsibility of making themselves accessible (financially, 
physically, and culturally/procedurally). They also need to respect the human 
rights of citizens that, as parties or otherwise, find themselves in their 
sessions. More importantly, they must enforce the rights of citizens against 
violations (horizontal or vertical). These being the basics of the judicial task, 
they cannot do anything less. 
4.4- The Judiciary and its Role of Protection of Human 
Rights: From whom and How? 
It is by now clear that the judiciary must protect human rights. But protect 
from whom? First and foremost, they need to protect it from themselves. The 
courts have the responsibility to respect human rights. They are thus expected 
to respect, for instance, the rights to fair hearing, bail, due process, appeal, 
expression, representation by a counsel, etc. By so doing, i.e. through 
extending respect, they protect human rights from themselves. Secondly, the 
courts have the responsibility to protect human rights from vertical violators, 
i.e., governmental bodies who administer rights. Such are the police, the 
prosecution, the correction and rehabilitation centers, or administrative 
agencies, etc. To protect citizens from governmental actors is not easy 
                                           
119 This observation is not made based on an opinion survey. The general frame of 
discussion on the matter with legal professionals, law students, judges, and officials in 
the HoF on diverse occasions and pieces on weeklies (e.g The Reporter, Addis Neger, 
etc) seem to suggest this. 
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because the courts depend on the selfsame executive bodies for the 
enforcement of their judgements (or orders, or decrees). The judges are 
expected to be very innovative in designing mechanisms by which they can 
make the executive accountable for their violations of the rights of citizens 
who are under their custody (such as that of arrested, detained, accused, and 
sentenced persons). They must also use a rigorous scrutiny into the activities 
of the executive, especially the law enforcement officials, when ruling on 
matters pertaining to arrest, bail, investigation, remand, detention, and 
imprisonment. But they also must seek and earn understanding, respect, and 
cooperation from these bodies. 
One of the things that the judges have to do in this regard is to bring 
demonstrable professionalism and technical competence in the area of human 
rights. In particular, they need to know the steps, techniques and methods by 
which human rights are concretized. In particular, they need to have a 
principled approach to the interpretation of legal texts that embody or 
implicate human rights. They need to bear in mind that rights clauses must 
always be interpreted liberally whereas power clauses must be interpreted 
more literally and strictly. They need to manifest dexterity in fleshing out the 
content and scope of a right by making a subject-object-addressee analysis. 
They also need to be efficient in determining reasonable limitations that can 
be imposed (or not) on the exercise of rights. They need to master the nuances 
and subtleties of the practical implications of the enforcement of rights. They 
must realize that “human rights protection is ultimately a practical 
exercise.”120 They must also understand the limits of their powers in this 
regard. 
The third category of persons from whom the courts must protect human 
rights is other people. Other people do what is often termed ‘horizontal 
violation of human rights’. This can be done of course if there is first a 
legislative framework that protects rights from other individuals or non-state 
actors. Here, often, the task is to penalize the violator and to redress the 
victim of the violation. 
4.5-The Limits of Judicial Power to Protect Human Rights 
By far the greatest limitation of the courts in their endeavour to protect human 
rights is that they depend on the sword of the executive and the purse of the 
legislature, although much less the latter. In Ethiopia, the fact that they are 
                                           
120 John McMillan,”The Role of the Ombudsman in Protecting Human Rights” (paper 
presented on a conference on ‘Legislatures and the Protection of Human Rights’ at 
the University of Melbourne, 21 July 2006), p. 9. 
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not the ultimate arbiters on constitutional matters might undermine their 
position vis-à-vis the other organs in the trias politica to act in defense of 
constitutional human rights.121 Even if (and when) this second limitation is 
overcome, the fact that the country’s public resources are patently meagre 
make it difficult for the courts to order this or that kind of remedy for human 
rights violation. But one quickly notes that governments will never have 
resources for human rights; they make resources available for them because 
our constitutional and international commitments demand no less than that. 
After all, human rights are not luxuries as many people would assume; they 
are basic necessities for a decent human existence. 
Conclusions  
The aim of this piece was to explore the mechanisms through which we can 
make a legal sense of human rights. It aimed at raising some questions 
concerning the task of making human rights a set of legally consumable 
commodities. It sought to make a call to look beyond human rights 
fundamentalism and cynicism which legislate utopian dogmatism and 
political despair respectively. It sought to challenge us to take steps to move 
from political rhetoric (centred on the constitution) to legal reality (centred 
mainly on the judiciary). Noting that human rights are moral entitlements that 
all human beings claim as such, we sought to see ways through which we can 
concretize them by making a legal and judicial sense of human rights. The 
key features of human rights—inherence, inalienability, inviolability, 
universality, trans-temporality—were identified. The various ways in which 
we can classify them is also discussed. Why they matter to us is also stressed. 
The position of human rights in the past and present constitutions of 
Ethiopia was also briefly explored. The fact that the past of the Ethiopian 
public law has little to commend about human rights is noted. The fact that in 
the contemporary constitutional law of Ethiopia human rights (both the 
                                           
121 The lack of conceptual clarity about the judicial role in a legal system that generally 
leans to the civilian tradition of continental Europe—whether the judges are neutral 
umpires in a proceeding or active agents of public policy enforcement –also 
contributes to the limited role courts play in taking a more robust stance with regard 
to the protection and enforcement of human rights. One notes that if one conceives 
his/her role as one of the former, then there tends to be little for the court to do in any 
type of case, whereas if he/she conceives of his/her role as one of the former, then 
there is the likelihood that they will take it as their responsibility to look after human 
rights in their judicial role. For the difference in the role of judges in the two 
traditions, see generally Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State 
Authority: A Comparative Approach to Legal Process (2nd ed). New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1991. 
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principle and the details) loom large is also noted. The fact that a wide range 
of rights recognized in the IBR are incorporated in the Ethiopian Bill of 
Rights is underscored. The reach and application, the interpretation, the 
limitations, and the entrenchment of the provisions of chapter three, and some 
of the specific rights embodied in the chapter are discussed along with the 
institutional framework for their protection. 
In an attempt to make a legal sense of human rights, we looked at the 
options we have in order to move from mere political rhetoric to actual legal 
reality. The steps of concretization—from constitutional guarantee-to 
legislative protection-to judicial application-to executive implementation – 
and the levels of protection (the duty to respect, protect, and fulfil) are all 
explored. In an attempt to flesh out the steps toward making a judicial sense 
of human rights, we examined the procedural, substantive and remedial steps 
we might need to undergo in human rights litigation. Issues related to the 
reach (state or non state actors?) and application (direct or indirect?), 
determination of the content of the rights through making a subject-object-
addressee analysis, determination of legitimate limitations that can be 
imposed on the exercise of human rights, interpretation of human rights 
clauses, the entrenchment of rights clauses that results from their trans-
temporality are all examined one after the other.  
Against this background, the role of the judiciary in the protection of 
human rights is discussed. The role of the judiciary in the trias politica as the 
institution that does justice without fear, favour, or prejudice is stressed. The 
state’s role in the protection of human rights in general (responsibility to 
respect, protect, and fulfil) and the judiciary’s take on that is noted. Its role as 
the voice of reason, the normalizer of politics, the protector of the weak from 
the strong, the poor from the rich, and the powerless from the powerful is also 
underscored. The courts’ role to protect human rights from the judiciary itself, 
from vertical and horizontal violators is also put in perspective. Some of the 
limits of the judicial power in its endeavour to protect human rights are also 
noted. These thoughts, it is hoped, will contribute to clarity of our conception 
of how to make legal sense of human rights in Ethiopia and to our vision of 
the court’s role in this regard. 
 
 
